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Abstract
A venture capitalist faces a trade-off between the extent of
managerial advice allocated to each start-up and the total number of
firms advised. Diminishing returns to advice per firm call for a larger
portfolio. As advice gets diluted, further expansion of the portfolio
eventually becomes unprofitable.
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Germany1 Introduction
It is a stylized fact that the typical portfolio of a venture capitalist (VC) includes several
ﬁrms, although a limited number of them (see Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Sahlman
(1990), Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) and Reid, Terry and Smith (1997). Gompers and
Lerner (1999) summarize recent research on venture capital). How many start-ups should
a VC include in her portfolio? We argue that the optimal company portfolio results from
at r a d e - o ﬀ between the number of ﬁrms included and the advisory eﬀort allocated to each
one. With diminishing returns on advice in each ﬁrm, it is better to expand the number
of companies rather than concentrating advice on a single project. On the other hand,
the VC’s eﬀort cost increases progressively as more ﬁrms are included. Advice is easily
stretched too thin, thereby reducing the survival chances of all ﬁrms in the portfolio.
When projects become riskier, the VC must cede a higher proﬁt share to entrepreneurs to
secure their eﬀort which is critical for survival. With her own proﬁt share eroded, the VC
eventually ﬁnds it unattractive to expand the portfolio further. In developing a simple
model of VC activity with double-sided moral hazard, our analysis draws on Repullo and
Suarez (1999), Casamatta (1999) and Strobel (2000). These authors assume, like all other
contributers in this ﬁeld, that a VC ﬁnances only one entrepreneur.
2 A Simple Model
Venture Capital Activity: We assume that each project yields R>0 if successful
and zero if it fails. An entrepreneur pursues exactly one project, all being identical. In
exchange for a proﬁts h a r e1 − si,t h eV Cm u s tﬁnance the entire start-up cost I of
i =1 ,...,n symmetric projects since entrepreneurs are assumed to have no resources
of their own. Apart from supplying funds, the VC provides managerial assistance ai.
The entrepreneur’s contribution ei ∈ {0,1} is deemed critical. Her shirking will certainly
result in business failure. We assume a survival probability P (ei,a i)=eip(ai), satisfying
p0 (ai) > 0 >p 00 (ai) and p(ai) < 1 over the relevant range. Active managerial consulting
2thus adds value and enhances the probability of success. Such services are increasingly
costly, however. In supporting a portfolio of n companies, the VC’s total managerial
input amounts to A =
n P
i=1
ai = an,w h e r eai = a by symmetry. The VC’s eﬀort cost c(A)








, ε > 0, 0 < θ < 1. (1)
Neither the eﬀort of each entrepreneur nor the extent of managerial advice are veriﬁable
and contractable. The informational asymmetry is reﬂected in the following sequence of
decisions. First, the VC chooses a number n of start-up ﬁrms, oﬀering an equity share
si to each entrepreneur. Next, given n and si,e ﬀorts are chosen. Finally, risk is resolved
and payments distributed. The model is solved by backward induction. Both parties are








i = eip(ai)siR − l(ei) ≥ 0,i =1 ,...,n, (i)
IC
E : p(ai)siR − β ≥ 0,i =1 ,...,n, (ii)
IC
F : {ai} =a r gm a x{[
P
i eip(ai)(1− si)R] − c(A)}. (iii)
Condition (i) is the participation constraint of entrepreneurs. To attract them, the con-
tract must at least yield an expected income equal to the alternative income, normalized
to zero. Conditions (ii) and (iii) reﬂect the ex post incentive constraints. Given that
contracts are already ﬁxed and investments are sunk, agents choose eﬀort to maximize
the remaining income that is still at their discretion. Emphasizing the critical nature
of the entrepreneurs’ eﬀort, their choice is restricted to two alternatives, high eﬀort and
shirking.
Eﬀort and Advice: Optimal managerial advice in (2iii) must satisfy
eip
0 (ai)(1− si)R = c
0 (A),i =1 ,...,n. (3)
3Anticipating the ex post incentive constraints, the VC will always oﬀer a proﬁts h a r e
suﬃcient to satisfy (2ii), eliciting high eﬀort e∗
i =1 . Otherwise, she would earn no revenue.
What then is the minimum proﬁts h a r esi to retain the entrepreneurs’ incentive? Taking
logarithmic diﬀerentials of (2ii) and (3) at the symmetric equilibrium solution and using
(1), we obtain1
IC
E :ˆ s = − ˆ R − (1 − θ)ˆ a, IC
F :( θ + ε)ˆ a = ˆ R −
s
1 − s
ˆ s − εˆ n. (4)
A higher return R and a larger proﬁts h a r e1 − s for the VC boost the marginal beneﬁts
of advice while a larger portfolio raises the marginal cost of advice. The entrepreneur’s
proﬁt share may be reduced if her incentives are strengthened by a higher project value







ˆ R − εˆ n
¸




When the VC increases advice because of a higher project value R, she boosts the ﬁrm’s
survival chance. A smaller proﬁts h a r et h e ns u ﬃces to retain the entrepreneur’s incentive.
With her own proﬁt share larger, she advises even more intensively. When this cycle
converges, the total eﬀect is positive, Ψ > 0, and exceeds the direct eﬀect.





(1 − θ)εˆ n − (1 + ε) ˆ R
i
. (6)
When more ﬁrms call for support, the VC advises each one less. As the success rate falls,
she must oﬀer higher shares to her entrepreneurial partners to enlist their eﬀort.
Optimal Company Portfolio: With an optimal number of ﬁrms, the contribution of
the marginal start-up to proﬁts is zero. Diﬀerentiating (2) and imposing symmetry yields
πn ≡ dπ
dn =[ p(1 − s)R − I] − ac0 − npR ∂s
∂n. Although a larger portfolio dilutes advice in
1The hat notation indicates a logarithmic diﬀerential, ˆ a ≡ dln(a)=da/a etc. Because of (1), ˆ p =
(1− θ)ˆ a, ˆ p0 = −θˆ a, ˆ c =( 1+ε) ˆ A,a n dˆ c0 = ε ˆ A.
4(5), the marginal eﬀect on proﬁts is zero by the envelope theorem applied to (2iii). The
square bracket indicates the marginal contribution of an extra ﬁrm to VC proﬁts. The
second term reﬂects the additional eﬀort cost from extending managerial support to the
marginal ﬁrm. The last term captures a proﬁt destruction eﬀect. Having more ﬁrms leads
the VC to advise each one less, which erodes survival chances. To preserve incentives in
face of higher risk, the VC must cede a higher proﬁt share to entrepreneurs. Insert (6)




=[ θp(a)(1− s)R − I] − β
(1 − θ)ε
Ψ(s)
=0 , πnn < 0. (7)
The number of ﬁrms is determined by (7). By (5) and (6), n reduces a but raises s.
Since Ψ0 (s)=− 1−θ
(1−s)2 < 0,a l lt e r m si nπn decline with n,t h e r e b yf u l ﬁlling the suﬃcient
condition. As more ﬁrms are ﬁnanced, the proﬁt destruction eﬀect becomes more severe.
With small n, on the other hand, the VC advises rather intensively and can appropriate a
large proﬁt share without losing the entrepreneur’s eﬀort. Marginal beneﬁts (net of eﬀort
cost) of expanding the portfolio are then relatively high. A separate appendix proves
Proposition 1 A unique optimal number of portfolio companies exists, 0 <n ∗ < ∞.
If eﬀort cost were linear (ε =0 ), advice and proﬁts h a r ei n( 5 )a n d( 6 )w o u l db e
independent of n. The proﬁt destruction eﬀect would disappear, making marginal beneﬁts
ac o n s t a n tπn = θp(a)(1− s)R − I ≷ 0 and leaving the individual portfolio problem
indeterminate. If, on the other hand, the survival probability were linear (θ =0 ), a would
fall and s would increase in n as before. In this case, however, the beneﬁto fa ne x t r aﬁrm
(net of marginal eﬀort) would be unambiguously negative, making πn < 0 in (7). The
optimal number of ﬁrms would be driven to one, if that was still proﬁtable.
Proposition 2 The number of start-up ﬁrms in the VC’s portfolio increases with R.












5Depending on her proﬁt share, a larger return R directly raises the VC’s income by
θp(1 − s). The proﬁt from an extra ﬁrm is also strengthened by the fact that a higher
project value R encourages the VC to advise more intensively, making the ﬁrm more likely
to survive, θ(1 − s)Rp0aR > 0. By reducing risk, the VC may increase her own proﬁt
share without provoking the entrepreneur to shirk, which raises proﬁts by −θpRsR >
0. Finally, funding an additional start-up dilutes advice over more ﬁrms, leaving less
support and a higher risk for each individually. To preserve incentives, entrepreneurs
must be compensated with a higher proﬁt share, giving rise to the proﬁt destruction
eﬀect in (7). When projects become more valuable, however, the VC starts to advise
more intensively and cuts the entrepreneurs’ proﬁt share on account of lower risk. In
obtaining a larger share for herself, the VC is able to alleviate the proﬁt destruction eﬀect
by −( 1−θ
(1−s)Ψ)2εβcE · sR > 0, which boosts the incentive to expand portfolio size.
3F i n a l R e m a r k s
In real life, a VC ﬁnances a small number of start-up enterprises, typically fewer than
ten. This note has developed a model which rationalizes this fact. It is shown that
both diminishing returns to advice and convex eﬀort cost are necessary to determine the
optimal number of ﬁrms in a VC’s portfolio.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
To prove existence and uniqueness, we must ﬁrst show how a and s in (7) depend on n.
Advice and ProﬁtS h a r e : The solution for a and s follows from (2ii) and (3). Since
we must impose p ≤ 1, the form of p(a) in (1) implies an upper limit for advice of ¯ a.B y
the same argument, (2ii) implies a minimum proﬁts h a r es,
¯ a ≡ (1 − θ)
1/(1−θ) ,s = β/R. (A.1)
Figure 1 now plots the ICEcurve given in (2ii) in s,a-space:
IC
E : a = E (s)=¯ a · (s/s)
1/(1−θ) . (A.2)
This curve hits the upper limit at s, i.e. ¯ a = E (s).S i n c et h ep r o ﬁt share cannot exceed
one, it is bounded below by a = E (1) = ¯ as1/(1−θ). It is falling and convex, E0 < 0 <E 00.
The ﬁnancier’s incentive constraint (3) is
IC
F : a = F (s)=
·
R
γnε (1 − s)
¸1/(θ+ε)
. (A.3)
This curve is negatively sloped, F0 (s) < 0.S i n c eF 00 (s)=
−F0(s)(1−θ−ε)
(θ+ε)(1−s) ≷ 0,i ti sc o n c a v e
for 1 − θ < ε and convex otherwise. It satisﬁes F (1) = 0. To have an interior solution
with ICE binding, we must impose
F (s) ≤ ¯ a ⇔ (1 − θ)
θ+ε (γn
ε)
1−θ ≥ (R − β)
1−θ . (A.4)
7For a solution to exist, the incentive constraints in Figure 1must intersect. By equating
F (s)=E (s),w eg e tH (s) ≡ (1 − s)
1−θ sθ+ε =[ ( 1− θ)β]
θ+ε (γnε)
1−θ /R1+ε ≡ X.T h e
H-schedule satisﬁes H (0) = H (1) = 0 and attains a maximum at ¯ s = θ+ε
1+ε < 1 which
follows from H0 (s)=sε £
(θ + ε)(1−s
s )1−θ − (1 − θ)( s
1−s)θ¤
=0 . Evaluating H (s) at its
maximum gives the condition H (¯ s) >Xfor the existence of a solution,
H (¯ s)=
(1 − θ)








Under this condition, H (s)=X h a st w os o l u t i o n sf o rs, meaning that the incentive
constraints in Figure 1 intersect twice. For the solutions to be in the relevant range,
( A . 5 )a n d( A . 4 )m u s tb es a t i s ﬁed simultaneously. Multiplying (A.5) by R1+ε/β
θ+ε and










> (1 − θ)
θ+ε (γn
ε)
1−θ ≥ (R − β)
1−θ . (A.6)
Choosing R large and β small opens a wide wedge, allowing placement of the middle term
to this interval by choice of appropriate values for γ and n.
Of the two intersection points in Figure 1, A is the solution. To see this, note that all
combinations to the north east of the E-schedule are admissible choices for the VC. For
any given s,t h eF-curve gives the VC’s optimal advice according to (3). Applying the
envelope theorem to (2), the VC maximizes proﬁtb yi n c r e a s i n gh e ro w np r o ﬁt share, i.e.
by reducing s. She moves along the F-curve to the north west until the entrepreneur’s
incentive constraint binds at A. Equation (4) linearizes the two constraints at solution A.
The condition Ψ > 0 in (5) reﬂects the fact that ICE is steeper than ICF at A.2
The comparative statics in n is also illustrated in Figure 1.Al a r g e rn u m b e ro fﬁrms
n leaves the E-schedule unaﬀected but shifts down the F-schedule, moving solution A to
the south east. Advice per ﬁrm is reduced, and the entrepreneur’s equity share must be
increased on account of higher risk.
2Note that E0 (s)= −a
(1−θ)s < 0 and F0 (s)= −a
(θ+ε)(1−s) < 0, whence E0 (s) <F0 (s) ⇔ Ψ(s) > 0.
8Optimal Number of Firms: To prove proposition 1 claiming the existence and unique-
ness of n∗,w eu s ep(a)=s/s from ICE. Write (7) as πn = z1 (s) − z2 (s).N o t e t h a t
n enters the condition only via its eﬀect on s(n) w h i c hi st h ei n t e r s e c t i o no f( A . 2 )a n d
(A.3) with the lowest share s. The proﬁt creation and destruction eﬀects, z1 and z2,a r e
z1 (s) ≡ θRs
1 − s
s




Evaluating these terms at the lowest admissible equity share (see Figure 1), we get




Since Ψ0 < 0, Ψ gets larger for low values of s,m a k i n gz2 (s) comparatively small. In
raising R relative to β [see also the discussion of (A.6)], we make z1 (s) arbitrarily large,
both directly and indirectly on account of a smaller s.T h ee ﬀect on s also squeezes the
proﬁt destruction eﬀect at the lower boundary of s.W i t hR appropriately set, we have
z1 (s) >z 2 (s) > 0 in Figure 2.
Expanding portfolio size n raises the equity share s on account of the “dilution of
advice” eﬀect, see Figure 1.S i n c ez0
1 (s) < 0 and z0
2 (s) > 0, the proﬁtc r e a t i o ne ﬀect melts
down while the proﬁtd e s t r u c t i o ne ﬀect becomes ever larger. In particular, Ψ(¯ s)=0for
¯ s = θ+ε
1+ε < 1, which makes z2 (s) →∞for s → ¯ s.3 Since both schedules are monotonic, a
unique solution n∗ exists in the interval [n, ¯ n] which corresponds to the interval [s,¯ s].
3Evaluating at ¯ s = θ+ε
1+ε gives E0 (¯ s)=
−E(¯ s)(1+ε)
(1−θ)(θ+ε) and F0 (¯ s)=
−F(¯ s)(1+ε)
(1−θ)(θ+ε). By (A.2) and (A.3), there
is one ¯ n such that E (¯ s)=F (¯ s), implying a tangency solution E0 (¯ s)=F0 (¯ s) and Ψ(¯ s)=0in Figure 1.















Figure 1: Optimal Advice and Profit Share
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Z( s ) 2 profit
creation





Figure 2: Optimal Number of Firms
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